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Patterned Responses to Organizing: Case 
Studies of the Union-Busting Convention 
Richard W. Hurd and Joseph B. Uehlein 
In June 1993, the Industrial Union Department (IUD) of the AFL-CIO 
initiated a project to gather cases from affiliated unions that would highlight 
aspects of the National Labor Relations Board process deserving attention 
from those shaping labor law reform proposals. Based on the cases submitted, 
we conclude that in its current form the National Labor Relations Act serves 
to impede union organizing. Particularly problematic are NLRB policies that 
allow employers to wage no-holds-barred antiunion campaigns. Even where 
there are legal restrictions on specific actions, the penalties for violations are so 
meager that they serve no deterrent effect. The cases described below cover 
many industries, all parts of the country, large units and small, and collec-
tively suggest that union busting has become the convention among U.S. 
employers. 
Overview of the IUD Case Studies Project 
The request for case studies that the IUD circulated was relatively broad 
but focused primarily on union organizing. By October 1, 1993, we had 
received 213 case studies from twenty-one national unions. Of these, 167 
reported on organizing campaigns; included were campaigns in thirty-six 
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Most were submitted as 
brief summaries of one to four pages. This chapter highlights aspects of 
nineteen representative cases for which additional information was gathered 
through database searches and requests from the organizing and legal depart-
ments of the unions involved. 
The picture that emerges from a review of the cases is clear. Under the 
current legal structure, companies faced with an organizing drive are free to 
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conduct intense antiunion campaigns. Even those companies that have good 
relations with unions at other facilities often bitterly oppose union organiz-
ing. Union avoidance routinely involves the use of a management lawyer or 
consultant who is expert at defeating worker efforts to organize. Although 
many antiunion campaigns are run within the limits of the law, many others 
openly violate NLRB policies. The most common violation is discrimination 
against union activists in job assignments, discipline, and discharge. If the 
union manages to win the election, the employer often appeals certification to 
delay bargaining, in some cases for years. Even if the union is ultimately 
certified as bargaining agent, management may engage in hard bargaining as 
part of a long-term strategy to decertify the union. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted almost exclusively to summaries 
of the cases themselves. We believe that they offer compelling testimony to 
the need for labor law reform. In each topical section below, we offer several 
brief examples plus one case summary to give the reader a taste of the intensity 
of employer hostility toward workers who attempt to organize.1 
Union-Avoidance Routine 
A typical scenario has evolved for the employer's response to an organizing 
campaign. Consider, for example, the case of Aero Metal Forms in Wichita, 
Kansas. When twelve of the fifteen employees approached the International 
Association of Machinists (IAM)2 about organizing a union, the company 
hired an attorney to design an antiunion campaign. Supervisors were trained 
to identify and combat union supporters, and captive audience meetings were 
held. Workers were warned that the union would take them out on strike and 
that they could be replaced; they also were threatened with plant closure. The 
two most vocal union supporters were fired. The April 22, 1991, election 
resulted in a 6-6 tie with three challenged ballots. By the time the NLRB 
reached a final decision and declared the union a 7—6 winner on April 5, 
1993, only one union supporter still worked for Aero Metal. 
Even in the face of overwhelming evidence that their employees want union 
representation, some companies will go to great lengths to avoid recognition 
and bargaining. On May 27, 1992, Local 26 of the United Food and Commer-
cial Workers (UFCW) requested recognition from Home Style Foods in 
Hamtramck, Michigan, based on thirty-four signed cards from the thirty-
five employees. The company denied the request, hired a consultant, and 
implemented a textbook union-resistance campaign: captive audience meet-
1. The examples and case summaries are based on material submitted by the unions involved. 
A list of contact persons and supporting citations will be provided by the authors on request. 
2. Standard union abbreviations are used throughout, as indexed in Gifford 1992. 
Patterned Responses to 
ings, a suggestion box, letters to employe 
strikes and permanent replacements, adv 
arbitration system to resolve worker comp 
vocal union advocates, and even a promise i 
very end and that could take years." In spit 
the July 21, 1992, election and has prev 
decision. Nonetheless, there was still no cc 
months after 97 percent of the employee 
representation. 
Although most management campaigns 
some are more narrowly focused. In Februa 
ing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU] 
a majority of workers in a two-plant unit 
turing and Jennings Manufacturing. The 
Vote union and you will lose your job. Thi 
audience meetings, one-on-one discussion 
tin boards, lawn signs, and radio ads. Wall 
newspaper articles, blown up to five feet b) 
twelve-foot-by-three-foot banner proclai 
UNEMPLOYED." Sets of two identical pairs of 
ries, and supervisors explained that the on 
made in Crowley or Jennings for five dolla: 
in Mexico for three dollars per day. The NI 
unfair labor practice charges, in essence cot 
the election 275-222. 
CWA v. HarperCollins, San Francisi 
HarperCollins in San Francisco, owne 
psychology, feminist, and religious books 
employees are eligible for union member 
Months of effort on employee-manageme 
change, prompting a group of workers to o 
ers of America (CWA). On December 
petition for a unit of eighty-three employe 
HarperCollins sought to exclude twent 
agreed to four). The NLRB held eight 
February 1993- The hearings were prolon 
for example, questioned a receptionist for 
NLRB ultimately ruled with the union ; 
employees in the unit. The decision was 
and the election was scheduled for June 11 
ird and Joseph B. Uehlein 
gns. Even those companies that have good 
lities often bitterly oppose union organiz-
volves the use of a management lawyer or 
:ing worker efforts to organize. Although 
t within the limits of the law, many others 
: most common violation is discrimination 
emments, discipline, and discharge. If the 
the employer often appeals certification to 
or years. Even if the union is ultimately 
igement may engage in hard bargaining as 
ertify the union. 
; devoted almost exclusively to summaries 
re that they offer compelling testimony to 
;ach topical section below, we offer several 
iry to give the reader a taste of the intensity 
srs who attempt to organize.1 
>r the employer's response to an organizing 
the case of Aero Metal Forms in Wichita, 
n employees approached the International 
about organizing a union, the company 
union campaign. Supervisors were trained 
orters, and captive audience meetings were 
e union would take them out on strike and 
so were threatened with plant closure. The 
were fired. The April 22, 1991, election 
hallenged ballots. By the time the NLRB 
.red the union a 7-6 winner on April 5, 
11 worked for Aero Metal. 
I evidence that their employees want union 
ill go to great lengths to avoid recognition 
Local 26 of the United Food and Commer-
recognition from Home Style Foods in 
thirty-four signed cards from the thirty-
lied the request, hired a consultant, and 
;istance campaign: captive audience meet-
based on material submitted by the unions involved. 
tations will be provided by the authors on request. 
d throughout, as indexed in Gifford 1992. 
Patterned Responses to Organizing 63 
ings, a suggestion box, letters to employees at home, warnings about union 
strikes and permanent replacements, advance payment of bonuses, a new 
arbitration system to resolve worker complaints, discipline and dismissal for 
vocal union advocates, and even a promise from the owner to "fight this to the 
very end and that could take years." In spite of the campaign, the UFCW won 
the July 21, 1992, election and has prevailed on every subsequent NLRB 
decision. Nonetheless, there was still no contract in October 1993, seventeen 
months after 97 percent of the employees expressed their desire for union 
representation. 
Although most management campaigns attack unionization on many fronts, 
some are more narrowly focused. In February 1993, the Amalgamated Cloth-
ing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) collected authorization cards from 
a majority of workers in a two-plant unit in Louisiana—Crowley Manufac-
turing and Jennings Manufacturing. The employer adopted a single theme: 
Vote union and you will lose your job. This message was repeated via captive 
audience meetings, one-on-one discussions, written communications, bulle-
tin boards, lawn signs, and radio ads. Walls of the factories were covered with 
newspaper articles, blown up to five feet by three feet, about plant closings. A 
twelve-foot-by-three-foot banner proclaimed, "Wear the union label— 
UNEMPLOYED." Sets of two identical pairs of pants were hung around the facto-
ries, and supervisors explained that the only difference was that one pair was 
made in Crowley or Jennings for five dollars per hour and the other was made 
in Mexico for three dollars per day. The NLRB refused to issue a complaint on 
unfair labor practice charges, in essence condoning the threats. The union lost 
the election 275-222. 
CWA v. HarperCollins, San Francisco 
HarperCollins in San Francisco, owned by Rupert Murdoch, publishes 
psychology, feminist, and religious books. Half of the 150 highly educated 
employees are eligible for union membership, 80 percent of them women. 
Months of effort on employee-management task forces produced very little 
change, prompting a group of workers to contact the Communications Work-
ers of America (CWA). On December 18, 1992, CWA filed an NLRB 
petition for a unit of eighty-three employees (sixty-two signed the petition). 
HarperCollins sought to exclude twenty employees from the unit (CWA 
agreed to four). The NLRB held eight days of hearings in January and 
February 1993- The hearings were prolonged by management lawyers, who, 
for example, questioned a receptionist for three hours about her duties. The 
NLRB ultimately ruled with the union and included all sixteen contested 
employees in the unit. The decision was not issued until May 28, however, 
and the election was scheduled for June 18. 
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During the intervening months the company implemented a standard 
union-resistance campaign. Letters were sent to all employees at home, one 
from Vice President Clayton Carlson opposing "the insertion of an outside 
factor like CWA"; another was signed by all the managers, who argued that 
unionization "would not serve to promote cooperation and solidarity." CEO 
George Craig flew in from New York and held captive audience meetings. He 
declared, "This is war," and labeled as "disloyal" all employees involved with 
the C W A . He then promised to negotiate with an in-house association if 
employees dropped thcunion. 
The company also made a series of personnel changes. Two workers were 
promoted out of the unit, and four were laid off. Five of these six were on the 
organizing committee, and the other was a vocal union supporter. Subse-
quently, eleven new employees were hired who voted in the election. 
The aggressive resistance campaign succeeded. The C W A lost the June 18 
election 31—36 with four ballots challenged. On August 31 , the NLRB 
issued a complaint against HarperCollins on twelve violations charged by the 
union, including the four terminations. A hearing on the charges was sched-
uled for December 1993. 
Legal Delays 
Legal delays are a major barrier to organizing. As described above, manage-
ment lawyers frequently challenge unit determinations to buy time for a 
union-resistance campaign. In many situations, though, legal delay is more 
than a temporary stalling device. In 1964, the Service Employees' Interna-
tional Union (SEIU) won the right to represent maintenance employees at 
Long Island College Hospital in New York City. The hospital pursued a ten-
year legal challenge to the appropriateness of the unit that went all the way to 
the Supreme Court. The parties then began bargaining, but the passage of the 
1974 health-care amendments to the NLRA prompted a second round of 
legal challenges by the hospital, which lasted five years. The SEIU won a 
second election in January 1979 and was certified in August 1980. The 
employer refused to bargain, prompting a series of ULPs filed by the union 
and nine more years of hearings and appeals. When the NLRB issued rules 
establishing appropriate units for the health-care industry in 1989, the 
hospital again challenged the unit. In April 1993, the NLRB upheld an 
administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision and issued a bargaining order. As of 
October 1993, there was still no contract, twenty-nine years after the workers 
first voted for representation. 
A number of unions report that employers now are using the threat of legal 
delays to defeat unions. In an A C T W U organizing campaign at BMP Ameri-
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can in Medina, New York, the company successfully undermined support for 
the union with the aid of a June 8, 1993, memo to employees: 
This outside union has filed two sets of charges against the com-
pany. . . . Unfortunately, we have started on the road of a very, very long 
process. Our attorneys have advised us that generally the steps involve: 
an investigation, a possible trial, . . . a possible appeal to an NLRB 
panel, . . . and even a possible appeal to a Federal Appellate Court. . . . Many 
cases have lasted 5, 6, or 7 years until they become final. 
A similar approach was used by Crown Cork and Seal while opposing 
organizing by the United Steel Workers of America (USWA) at its Puerto 
Rico facility in 1 9 9 0 - 9 1 . The aggressive resistance is particularly noteworthy 
because the USWA has a good bargaining relationship with this employer in 
thirty-six plants in the United States and Canada. But this did not stop the 
company from making threats explicitly tied to legal delays in a lengthy 
December 11 , 1991, memo sent to each worker at home (translated from 
Spanish): 
o organizing. As described above, manage-
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employers now are using the threat of legal 
W U organizing campaign at BMP Ameri-
5. The company has prepared ULP charges for the NLRB. . . . The judge 
can issue a decision between two and twelve months. Either party can 
appeal. . . . The board can reasonably issue a decision between two months 
and two years. Either party can appeal. . . . It can reasonably take between six 
months and eighteen months for the court of appeals to issue a decision. 
Either party can appeal. . . . 
6. If there is an election and the Steelworkers win, the company would 
challenge the results. . . . This means that the company would nullify the 
need to negotiate with the USWA. 
7. If the USWA does not like the company's refusal to negotiate, it would 
have to file ULP charges—the company would appeal to the NLRB and the 
court of appeals. This process could take two years or more. 
AFSCME v. Fountain Valley Regional Hospital, Fountain 
Valley, California 
In May 1986, an affiliate of the American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) was contacted by registered nurses and 
other professional employees at Fountain Valley Regional Hospital. After 
collecting 520 authorization cards from a unit of 650 (80 percent), AFSCME 
filed for an election in November and the delays began. The hospital chal-
lenged the unit and presented lengthy testimony on a wide variety of techni-
cal and confidential employees. The hearings stretched over eight days in 
December 1986 and January 1987. The NLRB issued its decision on the unit 
on April 1, 1987, and scheduled the election for April 30 and May 1. 
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Management used the five-and-one-half-month delay to implement an 
antiunion campaign replete with the standard threats, promises, and captive 
audience meetings. The campaign was coordinated by the West Coast Indus-
trial Relations Association (WCIRA), a consulting firm known for its "Main-
taining Your Union Free Status" seminars. Based on papers filed by WCIRA 
with the U.S. Department of Labor, Fountain Valley paid more than $365,000 
for union-avoidance assistance during the first year. 
The election results were 278 for AFSCME and 274 for no union and 28 
challenged ballots (24 by the employer, 4 by the union). The regional office of 
the NLRB considered the challenges and issued a decision on November 16, 
1987. Both sides requested a review by the NLRB, which concurred with the 
regional office but not until October 1988. The challenged ballots were 
finally opened, and the union won 285—279- Fountain Valley refused to 
accept the results, appealed the decision, and refused to bargain, claiming that 
the union did not represent a majority of employees. 
Throughout the process of determining the election outcome, the hospital 
continued its antiunion campaign, prompting numerous ULP charges. A 
series of decisions from the NLRB were ignored, until June 12, 1991, when 
the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the hospital to bargain. Over 
the next twenty months bargaining sessions were held once per month and 
progress was painfully slow. Finally, on April 12, 1993, agreement was 
reached when the union resigned itself to accepting the status quo on most 
issues. Unbeknownst to AFSCME, a decertification petition had been filed 
two days earlier. Union members ratified the contract on April 16, but 
management refused to sign it. In the meantime, ULPs continued to pile up, 
and management openly violated an NLRB-ordered posting while it adorned 
hospital bulletin boards. There was still no signed agreement as of October 
1993, six and one-half years after workers voted to be represented by 
AFSCME. 
Blatant Labor Law Violations 
Some employers are not content to work within the friendly confines of 
NLRB regulations. Instead, they openly violate the law, most often by 
discriminating against the leaders of union organizing drives. Nearly half the 
cases submitted to the IUD for this project included specific details of workers 
being disciplined, laid off, or fired for union activity. In most of them, the 
NLRB eventually ruled against the employer—but long after the organizing 
campaign had been halted by worker fear. 
Consider ACTWU's organizing campaign at Surgical Appliance, Inc., in 
Cincinnati. Nearly half the 120 employees were visited in their homes over 
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campaign at Surgical Appliance, Inc., in 
nployees were visited in their homes over 
two days in early February 1993- Approximately 70 percent of those visited 
signed union authorization cards. Eight workers passed out organizing leaflets 
at the plant gate the next morning. An hour later all eight either were laid off 
or had their hours reduced. This scenario was repeated over the next few days 
until twenty-six union supporters were laid off. The organizing campaign 
had been stopped cold. 
Six months later, Surgical Appliances and ACTWU reached a settlement 
with the NLRB—$70,000 in back pay and a management agreement to cease 
and desist from interfering with union activity through threats, surveillance, 
unlawful restriction of the distribution of literature, interrogation, and dis-
crimination. ACTWU won the NLRB case, but Surgical Appliance avoided 
unionization by breaking the law quickly and severely, scaring the workers 
into retreat. 
Sheridan Manor Nursing Home in Buffalo, New York, responded similarly 
when faced with an organizing campaign by the CWA in late 1992. The push 
for unionization had originated among licensed practical nurses (LPNs), so 
Sheridan fired sixteen of its twenty-one LPNs on January 19, 1993, with no 
explanation. An election was held on August 5, but the ballots were impounded 
because of a company appeal of the unit determination. Subsequently, the 
LPNs were reinstated (without back pay) pending an NLRB hearing on the 
dismissals scheduled for October. 
A case involving the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) demon-
strates that blatant violations of the law can be combined with lengthy legal 
appeals. In December 1988, the UMWA was contacted by employees of 
Power, Inc., an Osceola Mills, Pennsylvania, surface mining operation owned 
by Ryan International of Great Britain. An election petition was filed on 
January 6, 1989 (forty-eight of seventy-four workers in the unit had signed 
cards). On March 10, thirteen days before the election, the company laid off 
thirteen workers, all of them union activists, including the leaders of the 
organizing campaign. The vote at the March 23 election was twenty-seven 
yes, thirty no, and ballots cast by the thirteen laid-off workers were chal-
lenged by the employer. 
As the case worked its way through the NLRB process over the next four 
years, the company committed numerous ULPs, including laying off twelve 
additional union supporters. As new ULPs were filed, they were appended to 
the previous case. All of this delayed decisions on the challenged ballots and 
the prior charges. The ALJ's initial decision was not issued until May 6, 1992. 
The company, found guilty of most of the ULP charges, appealed. The NLRB 
issued its decision on May 28, 1993, upholding the ALJ decision on all 
substantive points. The thirteen challenged ballots finally were opened on 
June 22, and, as expected, all were for the union; the final vote stood at forty 
yes, thirty no. Power, Inc., appealed the decision to the District Court. 
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ILGWU v. Domsey Trading Corporation, Brooklyn, New York 
Domsey buys and exports used clothing, and its employees are mostly 
Haitian and Latin American immigrants. On December 1, 1989, a repre-
sentative of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) 
arrived at Domsey to request recognition. Seventy-six percent of the employ-
ees had signed cards in a unit of 243. A key union supporter with twenty-
seven years' seniority informed the owner's son that the union was there to see 
him. Fifteen minutes later, the union supporter was fired. That afternoon, the 
employer's attorney told the union's attorney that he was not worried, because 
even if the employer had to reinstate the discharged worker, the back-pay 
liability would not amount to much. By late January, Domsey fired two more 
pro-union workers. On January 30, 90 percent of the employees walked out 
because of the illegal firings. 
During the strike, management representatives subjected the striking 
workers, most of whom were Haitian, and union organizers to outrageous 
harassment. The owner's son placed a "voodoo table" covered with a black 
tablecloth in front of picketing workers, placed candles and bananas on the 
table, and called to the workers, "This is for you monkeys to eat." He and his 
cohorts called women picketers "whores" and shouted explicit obscenities at 
them. They called the picketers "lazy" and "stupid niggers," and they told 
them that they were being sprayed with water to wash off their smells. 
On August 10, 1990, the 132 remaining strikers unconditionally requested to 
return to work. Domsey refused to rehire some of them, and those who were 
reinstated suffered severe abuse, including physical attacks and verbal harass-
ment. A particularly repugnant management employee, later compared by an 
ALJ to Attila the Hun, physically attacked one union supporter and injured 
her seriously enough that she had to be hospitalized; he also screamed 
obscenities in the faces of others. Some union supporters quit in fear and 
disgust. Others were fired. 
Over the next three years the NLRB took a consistent stance in opposition 
to Domsey's blatant disregard for the law. ALJ and NLRB decisions found the 
employer guilty of multiple ULPs. A court injunction ordered a halt to 
Domsey's discriminatory treatment of union supporters, and when the com-
pany ignored the injunction, the NLRB secured a contempt of court citation. 
An election was eventually held on March 27, 1992, more than two years 
after the petition was filed. By this time only a third of the original union 
supporters still worked at Domsey, and the union lost 170—120. Although 
the NLRB overturned the election results, the company continued to avoid 
compliance with the law by appealing every decision. As of October 1993, the 
case was still before the U.S. Court of Appeals. 
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Weaknesses of NLRB Protections and Penalties 
Even when the NLRB concludes that management has violated the law, its 
options for achieving compliance are limited. As noted above, it is standard 
practice for management lawyers to raise objections in order to delay an 
election, and in the event that the union wins, to challenge the results and 
delay certification. Such was the case in 1989 when the SEIU sought to 
represent Lakeside Community Hospital employees in Clear Lake, California. 
The hospital filed multiple objections, including a "concern" it had regarding 
the local union's method of selecting vice presidents. In response, the NLRB 
issued a scolding: "Objections 1, 2, 3, 6, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 23, 24, and 28, 
appear to be frivolous and border on an abuse of the Board's processes. . . . The 
Board froums upon the filing by any party of multiple, obviously non-
meritorious objections" (emphasis added). The hospital not only continued its 
appeals but subsequently committed numerous ULPs, prompting two addi-
tional board orders and a case before the U.S. Court of Appeals, which was 
heard on September 13, 1993- As Lakeside has demonstrated, frowns are 
unlikely to convince determined employers to alter their union-avoidance 
practices. 
The most commonly used remedy in cases of employer ULPs is a cease and 
desist order, which is to be posted in central locations on the company's 
property. Unfortunately, many employers simply ignore the order even if they 
post the decision as required. For example, Dayton Hudson Corporation has 
openly violated the law as a response to UAW organizing at its Detroit area 
stores. On August 9, 1991, an election at a store in Fairlane (a narrow loss for 
the UAW) was set aside by the NLRB because of numerous employer ULPs. 
The violations included threats, coercive interrogation, discipline of union 
activists, following employees into restrooms, videotaping workers while they 
spoke to union organizers, and monitoring phone calls. Hudson's was ordered 
to cease such behavior and to post notices to that effect. A new election was 
scheduled for October 30, 1992. While the notices were still posted, Hud-
son's repeated the same behavior—intimidation, harassment, threats, inter-
rogation, and spying. The NLRB canceled the election and issued a complaint 
detailing more than one hundred separate violations. Hearings were held, and 
an ALJ decision was expected in late 1993. 
In situations in which discharge is clearly tied to union activity, the NLRB 
will order reinstatement with back pay less interim earnings from other 
sources. The penalty is so modest, however, that it appears to be ineffective, as 
every case in the preceding section demonstrates. In fact, employers that 
discharge union supporters during organizing campaigns typically commit 
multiple other violations as well; consider, for example, the behavior of 
Rock-Tenn. 
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The United Paperworkers International Union (UPIU) began organizing 
Rock-Tenn's Columbus, Indiana, facility in July 1989- The employer imme-
diately started an aggressive antiunion campaign. Eight pro-union employees 
were discharged, union supporters were placed under surveillance, a no-
solicitation, no-distribution rule was enforced, numerous employees were 
interrogated, and management threatened to close the plant and reduce 
benefits. The union lost a February 1, 1990, election 50-70. The NLRB 
issued complaints in October and December 1989 and in March 1990. The 
employer continued to Jiarass and discriminate against union supporters, 
leading to more charges. Nonetheless, the union eventually achieved majority 
support in a second election on February 5, 1991. Over the next year the 
company engaged in hard bargaining while providing direct support to 
two employees who conducted a decertification campaign, and additional 
ULPs piled up. Finally, on May 25, 1993, an ALJ decision found Rock-Tenn 
guilty of virtually all ULPs plus violation of Weingarten rights and interfering 
with NLRB processes. The company appealed. 
UFCW v. Gress Poultry, Scranton, Pennsylvania 
The UFCW conducted an organizing campaign among 250 workers at 
Gress Poultry in 1986. In spite of the challenge of communicating in seven 
different languages to the largely immigrant workforce, the union was able to 
secure authorization cards from nearly 70 percent of the employees. An 
election was scheduled for December 23, 1986. The owners hired consultant 
Ray Blankenship to "run an anti-organizing campaign." 
Blankenship held a series of three captive audience meetings for each of the 
three shifts, the first meetings in early December, the second ten days before 
the election, and the final meetings the day before the election. The theme at 
these meetings was straightforward: If the union won, the plant would be 
closed. Blankenship told the employees about one of his clients who had lost 
an election and padlocked the plant. To make sure that the message was 
understood by the multilingual audience, he held up a huge padlock for 
everyone to see. To drive the message home on election day, Blankenship held 
a picture of a lock and key and told employees that the employer had given 
him a padlock to lock the door when he closed the plant down. In addition to 
the threats, Blankenship took photographs of employees talking to union 
organizers and engaged in other acts designed to intimidate union supporters 
After losing the election 114-71 with 38 challenged ballots, the union 
filed objections and charges of ULPs. Because Blankenship had actually 
delivered threats himself (most consultants stay in the background), he was 
charged jointly along with the employer. The case inched its way through the 
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NLRB process with decisions for the union at every step. During the lengthy 
appeals process, support for the union eroded, and the UFCW gave up on its 
organizing objective. Along with the NLRB, however, the union continued to 
pursue the case against Blankenship. 
On July 18, 1990, an ALJ found that Blankenship had committed five 
ULPs during the election. The ALJ issued a cease and desist order and a 
requirement that Blankenship post the order conspicuously in his Green-
wood, Indiana, offices. Blankenship appealed to the NLRB. On March 31, 
1992, noting that Blankenship had a ten-year record of labor law violations in 
a series of cases for different employer clients, the NLRB upheld the ALJ 
decision. Blankenship appealed. 
On July 15, 1993, the U.S. Court of Appeals enforced the NLRB order. In 
perhaps the ultimate statement attesting to the enforcement power of the 
NLRB, Blankenship submitted a certificate of posting indicating that the 
notice had been posted "on the seat of our employees' toilet." On September 8, 
1993, the NLRB initiated civil contempt proceedings. 
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First-Contract Problems 
As several cases we have already discussed make clear, winning a represen-
tation election does not necessarily secure union protection for workers. 
Utilizing the services of lawyers and consultants expert at frustrating the 
bargaining process, employers have been able to avoid such basic union 
protections as the grievance and arbitration system. 
Although "surface bargaining" is considered a ULP by the NLRB, "hard 
bargaining" is tolerated. For example, the UMWA won an election at Shanefelter 
Industries in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, on April 26, 1991, by a vote of 22—6. 
The firm hired labor consultant Kelvin Berens from Omaha, Nebraska, to 
negotiate. As of October 1993, two and one-half years of monthly negotia-
tions had resulted in no agreement on even basic issues. During bargaining 
the consultant displays a lackadaisical attitude by reading the newspaper 
while the union presents its proposals or engaging in idle banter about cattle 
ranching, skiing, or amusement parks to kill time and prolong the process. 
The union has repeatedly filed ULPs only to be told that "hard bargaining" is 
not a violation. 
In January 1990, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
(IBEW) won an election in a fourteen-member unit against Coastal Electric 
Cooperative in Walterboro, South Carolina. The firm hired attorney Julian 
Gignilliat to negotiate. As of October 1993, agreement had not been reached 
on most key issues, including seniority, just cause, management rights, 
i !•"•# 
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wages, and benefits. The company firmly opposes an arbitration clause, 
demanding that management be the last step in the grievance procedure. 
Gignilliat has stated that under the management proposal, if the union 
disagreed with the management's decision in the last step of the grievance 
process, it could strike "and I will replace every goddamn one of you." He also 
demands employment-at-will language. On September 18, 1992, an ALJ 
ruled for the union in a failure to bargain in good faith ULP case. The 
company appealed and the NLRB overturned the decision on June 30, 1993, 
reinstating a prior settlement agreement requiring the parties to meet and 
negotiate. 
BCTW v. Dawn Frozen Foods, Crown Point, Indiana 
In many cases, the company will stall negotiations for a year then support 
decertification efforts by, employees. The Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco 
Workers ' International Union (BCTW) won an election at Dawn Frozen 
Foods in Crown Point, Indiana, on March 28, 1991, by a 56—41 vote. Dawn 
hired attorney Robert Bellamy to negotiate. Negotiations were held monthly 
beginning in June. 
There was no movement even on such simple issues as a union bulletin 
board. In February 1992 negotiations, Bellamy informed the union negotiat-
ing team that it would not be get t ing an "old '60s Baker's contract" but a 
contract that reflected the "realities of the '90s." The "old" clauses that the 
company refused to consider included union security, dues checkoff, and plant 
visitation rights for union representatives. A decertification petition began to 
circulate in the spring with supervisor support. On June 10, 1992, an 
employee group filed for decertification, and a vote was set for July 8. 
The company made what it labeled its final offer on June 2 1 . At this stage 
the union was not worried about the decertification vote because it had an 
internal organizing campaign in place, and seventy-plus workers were wear-
ing union hats on the job every day. A federal mediator suggested that the 
union have the workers vote on the final offer, noting that management had 
told him that it could count hats and expected to lose the decertification 
election. The offer was voted down on June 28, and the union requested a new 
bargaining session. 
Coincidentally, on June 30, Robert Bellamy conducted an all-day seminar 
in Indianapolis, sponsored by the Indiana Chamber of Commerce, entitled 
"Remaining Union Free." In the final week before the decertification vote, the 
company ran an intense antiunion campaign with all of the standard ingredi-
ents: captive audience meetings, supervisors holding one-on-ones, the owner 
promising to give the workers everything the union had negotiated without 
union dues, and slides of the plant with a closed sign on the door. 
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On July 7, Bellamy sent a letter to the union negotiator via certified mail 
responding to the request for a bargaining session to discuss the company's 
"final offer," which had been voted down: 
That final offer remains final. . . . 
What final means is that Dawn is prepared to take a strike if its final 
offer is not acceptable. . . . 
—Final means you have gotten all there is to get— there is not one penny 
more—period. 
—If a strike does occur, Crown Point will of course exercise its right to 
continue operations and hire replacements. . . . 
—If you do not believe me when I say that something is FINAL, go ask the 
UAW in Cambellsville, Kentucky. After I gave a final offer, they went on 
strike over an open shop clause . . . permanent replacements were hired, the 
union is now gone. . . . 
FINAL means FINAL. 
Copies of the letter were hand delivered on the shop floor by supervisors to 
every employee. The next day, the BCTW lost the decertification elec-
tion 51 -48 . 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
We believe that the cases collected by the Industrial Union Department lay 
bare the assumption of many academics and policy makers that blatant union 
busting is practiced only by a relatively small group of extremists in the 
management community. The underlying position of most employers is 
hostile to employee rights to organize and engage in concerted action. Given 
the widespread animus displayed toward unions and the current state of labor 
law, employer abuse of the right to organize is bounded only by the ingenuity 
of the lawyers and consultants who have made this field of practice their 
specialty. 
We also believe that dramatic change in the law is needed to counteract the 
management union-busting convention. Based on^ the cases we have col-
lected, a number of problem areas must be addressed if the right of workers to 
organize is to be protected. 
1. Employer interference with workers' decision regarding unionization 
should be curtailed. Steps should be taken to limit management's ability to 
intimidate workers with threats, surveillance, and continuous supervisory 
pressure. 
2. For employers who openly violate labor laws in order to defeat organiz-
ing campaigns, the costs of noncompliance must be increased. Particular 
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attention should be given to proposals that would protect union supporters 
from discrimination, especially unjust dismissal. 
3. Steps should be taken to speed up the NLRB process. Election delays 
allow management to exploit workers' fears and intimidate union supporters. 
Certification and bargaining delays deny workers the right to union represen-
tation and contract protection. 
4. Restrictions should be placed on the role of consultants in union-
avoidance campaigns. Penalties also should be considered for consultants and 
law firms associated with illegal union busting activities. 
5. Steps should be taken to ensure that a decision by workers to unionize 
cannot be circumvented by employers that refuse to engage in good-faith 
bargaining. 
Specific labor law reform proposals that address these concerns are spelled 
out in detail in the IUD.report Democracy on the Job: America's Path to a Just, 
High Skill, High Wage Economy. As summarized there, "The three prerequi-
sites to rebuilding the union organizing process in this country are card 
majority recognition . . .; removal of employer interference from the certifica-
tion process and greater union access to employees; and binding arbitration of 
the first contract" (AFL-CIO 1994). 
The proposals offered by the IUD would place strict limits on employers' 
ability to thwart the right of workers to organize and join unions. They would 
also grant unions a reasonable opportunity to recruit new members in an 
atmosphere free of fear and intimidation. Finally, they would ensure that 
workers through their unions would have the opportunity to achieve contrac-
tual protection via meaningful collective bargaining. 
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